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SPILLOVERS THEORY AND ITS CONCEPTUAL
BOUNDARIES
BRETT FRISCHMANN*
INTRODUCTION
Wendy Gordon has noted that "most of IP law is concerned with
internalizing positive externalities."1 In two recent articles,
Spillovers2 (with Mark Lemley) and Evaluating the Demsetzian
Trend in Copyright Law,' I challenge the conventional economic
theory of intellectual property and specifically the idea that society
ought to use intellectual property systems to internalize externali-
ties when feasible.
The nature of the challenge-or the spillovers theory-can be
viewed in two ways. I would frame the challenge as an internal one
based on, and consistent with, welfare economics. In his reply to the
* Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School, Associate Professor, Loyola University
Chicago. © 2009 Brett M. Frischmann. For helpful comments on earlier drafts I thank Wendy
Gordon, George Hay, David Hoffman, Mark Lemley, Oskar Liivak, Joshua Teitelbaum,
Spencer Waller, Joshua Wright, and participants in the Boundaries of Intellectual Property
Symposium. I would also like to thank Anne Barron and Harold Demsetz for their thoughtful
replies to my prior work.
1. Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES
617, 622 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). As Professor Gordon noted during her
remarks at the symposium and has developed in detail in her scholarship, Intellectual
Property (IP) law need not and should not be concerned myopically with internalizing positive
externalities. It would, in my view, be better to modify her observation by dropping the word
"internalizing"-that is, to say that most of IP law is concerned with positive externalities
because of the nature of the intellectual activities and resources being subject to legal
regulation. The difficult, contested issues--very often, boundary issues of what is allowed in
the system, of what the scope of and relationships between private and public rights should
be, and so on-can be understood not just in terms of whether to internalize, but also in terms
of which types of externalities to internalize, which types to leave alone, and which types to
promote.
2. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
3. Brett Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. &
ECON. 649 (2007) [hereinafter Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend].
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latter article, economist Harold Demsetz seems to accept this view
while critiquing aspects of the analysis.4 Others, such as economist
Anne Barron, have critiqued the articles, suggesting that the
spillovers theory is inconsistent with welfare economics, necessarily
relies on some other noneconomic social theory yet to be specified,
and thus is truly an external challenge to the conventional economic
theories of IP.5
What is interesting about these responses is how they frame a
boundary dispute between economic and other social theories of
intellectual property. That such a boundary exists is well under-
stood.6 What seems worth exploring, for purposes of this Article, is
how we arrive at and frame the contours of the boundary through
a discussion of spillovers. Claims about what lies on one side or the
other of the boundary may turn on assumptions and beliefs that
might not hold up on close inspection. For example, consider the
reason why Julie Cohen believes spillover theory is unlikely to be
valued by economics:
The spillovers argument, however, provides no determinate
standard.... In the real world, this objection should not be fatal;
indeterminacy does not rule out pragmatic policymaking. Within
the epistemological confines of economic analysis of law,
however, generalized reliance on "externalities" tends to be
perceived as signaling a lack of analytical rigor. The problem, in
other words, is not the argument itself, but rather these theo-
rists' inability to provide an answer in the terms that their
discipline values most highly.'
4. Harold Demsetz, Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," 4 REv.
L. & ECON. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Demsetz Reply].
5. Anne Barron, Copyright Infringement, 'Free Riding' and the Lifeworld (London Sch.
of Econ. & Political Sci., Law, Soc. & Econ. Working Paper No. 17, 2008), available at
http://ssm.comlabstract=1280893.
6. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIs
L. REv. 1151, 1201 (2007).
7. Id. at 1200-01. Cohen calls for a more sustained engagement (by copyright scholars)
with "well-established humanities and social science methodologies ... available for
investigating the origins of artistic and cultural innovation," including "[a] wide range of work
in social and cultural theory" and "disciplines, ranging from musicology to literary theory to
art criticism." Id. at 1156, 1176. Though I disagree with some aspects of her characterization
of economic analysis, I agree with her argument about the need to look more carefully at
cultural theory and practice and integrate lessons from many disciplines beyond economics
into our understanding of the copyright system and the various social systems it affects.
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Not surprisingly, I disagree with her view of "the epistemological
confines of economic analysis of law" and the perceived need for
determinacy.' Our disagreement rests, I think, on a version or
offshoot of the boundary highlighted above. Determinacy is a
requirement imposed by the exigencies of policy making or decision
making more generally, but it is not an epistemological requirement
imposed by economics or the economic analysis of law. If one
employs economic (or any other) methodologies to resolve or guide
decision making through, for example, cost-benefit analysis, then
one inevitably faces difficult questions about what costs and benefits
count. As described below, the spillovers theory raises these
questions along the boundary noted above.
In this Article, I reengage this debate and the critiques I have
mentioned, and explore the boundary between economic and other
social theories of intellectual property. I begin with a brief discus-
sion of the conventional economic theories of intellectual property.
Next, I discuss the spillovers theory and various critiques, and
reflect on a number of conceptual boundaries that surface in this
discussion.
I. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The basic economic justification for intellectual property rights
is that exclusive rights provide the necessary incentives for private
investment in creating intellectual resources.9 Information re-
sources face a well-known supply-side problem common to public
goods°: the inability to cheaply exclude competitors and nonpaying
8. I also disagree with her characterization of the spillovers idea as nothing more than
"generalized reliance on 'externalities."' Id. at 1200-01; see infra Part II (overview of spillovers
theory). Moreover, I am concerned (again, not surprisingly) with Cohen's characterization of
what the discipline "values most highly." Cohen, supra note 6, at 1201. I must confess some
exasperation with both the assumptions often adopted by and about economics. My
exasperation is probably the result of straddling a difficult line and being pushed from both
sides.
9. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 119 (3d ed. 2003); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005).
10. On the public goods nature of intellectual resources (ideas, information, expression,
and so on), see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 272-73 and the sources cited therein;
on how such resources generate different types of externalities, see Brett M. Frischmann,
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consumers (free riders) presents a risk to investors perceived ex
ante (prior to production), and this risk may lead to undersupply.
Essentially, in the absence of intellectual property law, there would
be a significant underinvestment in some types of intellectual
resources because of the risk that competitors would appropriate the
value of the resources. Granting intellectual property rights lessens
the costs of exclusion, raises the costs of free riding, encourages
licensing, and, as a result, allows the owner to appropriate a greater
portion of the surplus generated by the production and distribution
of intellectual resources."
Most economic analyses of intellectual property focus on tradeoffs
associated with exclusivity. 2 Exclusivity is a supply-side concern
that is relevant to assessing how well markets will function. IP
rights improve the supply-side functioning of markets for intel-
lectual products (inventions, works, and so on) as well as those
markets further downstream for derivative commercial end pro-
ducts. Though each raises additional complications, the reward,
prospect, and commercialization theories of IP 3 all take IP-enabled
exclusivity as the rerevant means for fixing a supply-side problem.
The theories differ largely in terms of where in the supply chain IP-
enabled exclusivity is needed and the degree of control/exclusivity
needed.
These theories assume that the market mechanism will best
aggregate information regarding demand for such investment. Put
in a slightly different way, the theories are premised on the notion
that private investment in the production, development, and
commercialization of IP subject matter will be allocated efficiently
on the basis of expected returns in downstream commercial mar-
Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301, 310-21 [hereinafter
Frischmann, Speech]; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 258-61; on public goods and
externalities generally, see, for example, RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 39-290 (2d ed. 1996).
11. See generally Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 3, 5 (1991).
12. This and part of the next paragraph are drawn from a prior essay. Brett M.
Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2143, 2157-58 (2009).
13. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 26-29 (2003) (reward); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 707-11 (2001)
(commercialization); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 266 (1977) (prospect).
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kets, so long as IP rights are available to provide the necessary
exclusivity." This premise connects with the idea, articulated well
by Harold Demsetz, that markets efficiently aggregate, process, and
respond to information about what people want. In particular, the
price mechanism provides a remarkably effective signal to producers
about where to direct their investments. 5
With a few exceptions,'" there is very little consideration of this
contestable premise, and there is no alternative demand-side theory
of what 'Trogress" we want. 7 If we conclude that maximizing social
utility is not the end, then market-based efficiency might not be
the appropriate metric for evaluating resource allocation. In
other words, if we reject maximizing utility as the overarching
objective, then there is no dispositive reason to place trust in the
market to effectively measure demand.'" Moreover, even if we stick
14. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 13, at 720.
15. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293,293
(1970); see also Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1969); cf. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 178-79 (1994) (making a similar point in the copyright context).
16. Scholars have identified demand manifestation problems in the context of reusers. See,
e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (2000)
("Creators of these works cannot appropriate all of the value that they create, and so will tend
to undervalue their uses of preexisting works."); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 1056-67 (1997) (explaining
why reusers cannot pay the full social value of their use); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the
Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 51-53 (1997) (same); cf. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic
Orthodoxy of 'Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 498 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen,
Lochner in Cyberspace] ("ITihere is no particular reason to believe that a new author's ability
to pay for the right to use an existing work is a good predictor of the quality of the eventual
result, whether quality is measured in terms of market success or by some other standard.").
17. For a postmodern approach to rethinking "Progress," see Margaret Chon, Postmodern
"Progress" Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 98 (1993).
18. In the United States, patent and copyright laws are generally seen as utilitarian, but
it is important to recognize that intellectual property laws are not necessarily utilitarian, even
in the United States. Utilitarianism is a very complicated branch of philosophy, but the
complications do not matter here. Whatever version of utilitarianism one adopts, the common
principle is that priority in ranking, (e)valuation, decision making, and so on is given to states
of affairs that maximize the aggregate utility of society, when utility is measured by
happiness, pleasure or desire fulfillment, or some other comparable measure. See JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 93-94 (Univ. of Chicago Press 13th ed. 1906) (discussing the
"Greatest-Happiness Principle'). There is nothing about intellectual property that necessarily
incorporates this basic principle of utilitarianism. The IP clause of the U.S. Constitution, for
example, is surely instrumental; it links a goal (promoting "Progress of Science and useful
Arts') with a particular means (exclusive rights), but this does not make it utilitarian. U.S.
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to utilitarianism, there are good reasons to question whether will-
ingness to pay is a consistently effective mechanism for assessing
demand when information systems are involved because of the
prevalence of spillovers.19
The supply-side orientation of the economic theories coincides
with more general economic theories of property and especially the
idea that an important function of property rights is to internalize
externalities. Drawing on earlier work, let me briefly explain the
connections between externalities, markets, and property theory.2 °
Externalities, whether positive or negative, are understood to be
an important type of "market failure"-at times defined as the
absence of a market.2' The perceived problem is that externalities
generally are not fully factored into a person's decision about
whether and how to engage in an activity and consequently may
have a distorting effect on market coordination and allocation of
resources.22 That is, too few (many) resources may be allocated to
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Put another way, the end of progress in science and the useful arts
potentially could be, but certainly need not be, read to embody the central, driving normative
objective of utilitarianism-maximizing utility (however measured). See Brett Frischmann,
Capabilities, Spillovers, and Intellectual Progress: A New IP Consequentialism? (2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Frischmann, Consequentialism].
19. In a recent article, I challenged the notion that the price mechanism works effectively
in contexts when consumers productively use intellectual products in ways that produce
spillovers. See Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend, supra note 3, at 670-71. One
might argue that the market mechanism should be the default unless it can be shown that
an alternative, such as the government, would outperform the market. Cf. Demsetz Reply,
supra note 4, at 131. A comparative analysis would help to identify contexts in which one
mechanism or another might perform best. Still, it is not clear, especially in the area of
information systems, that we should choose the market mechanism as the default. Such a
choice risks systemic bias or distortions that are not justified by mere reference to the generic
advantages of decentralized decision making versus central planning. As Mark Lemley and
I (and others such as Tim Wu) have argued, property rights can overcentralize decision
making when compared with commons or semicommons regimes. See Frischmann & Lemley,
supra note 2, at 282; Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions,
92 VA. L. REv. 123, 125 (2005).
20. The next two paragraphs are drawn from Frischmann, Speech, supra note 10, at 301,
306.
21. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the
Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 59, 67 (Robert H. Havemand & Julius Margolis eds., 1970) (defining externality as
the absence of a functioning market).
22. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 39-43; JAMES E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES: THE CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND SIMILAR SOCIAL
COSTS 15 (1973); Arrow, supra note 21, at 67-68.
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activities that generate positive (negative) externalities because
those persons deciding whether and how to allocate resources fail to
account for the full range of benefits (costs). If those unaccounted-for
benefits (costs) were taken into account-internalized-the actors
might behave differently, for example, by reallocating their re-
sources in a more efficient manner.23
The distortion manifests on the supply side in terms of under-
supply or, in dynamic terms, reduced incentives to invest in what
would otherwise be optimal supply. Of course, as noted above, this
problem can occur anywhere in the "supply chain."24 Note that
observing the existence and measuring the magnitude of any
distortion would depend on a counterfactual assessment of what
would have been and generally assumes complete markets else-
where in the supply chain.25 Not surprisingly, empirical evidence
measuring distortions in incentives caused by externalities (or free
riding) is hard to come by.26
23. On the other hand, actors might not behave differently. See James M. Buchanan &
Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371, 373-74 (1962); Frischmann,
Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend, supra note 3, at 665-68.
24. See supra note 19.
25. This is one of the problems with partial equilibrium analyses in general. See Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 394
(2008).
26. Arguments about incentives often are framed in terms of "free riding" or strategic
holdouts where people do not reveal their willingness to pay so they can free ride on others'
investments; these arguments are theoretical and often lack empirical foundation. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Coriat & Fabienne Orsi, Establishing a New Intellectual Property Rights Regime
in the United States: Origins, Content and Problems, 31 RES. POL'Y 1491, 1492 (2002)
(examining the free riding rationale); Lemley, supra note 9, at 1032 (same); cf. Keith E.
Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, 134 REV. WORLD ECON. 186,
187-88 (1998) ('The need for [intellectual property rights] arises from the fact that, without
them, a piece of potentially valuable information would suffer from overuse.... This congestion
problem, arising from free-riding behaviour, imposes the dynamic costs of limited cultural
creation and product development, and reduced growth, on economies that fail to recognise
it adequately."); Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Free Revealing and the Private-Collective
Model for Innovation Incentives, 36 RES. & DEV. MGMT. 295, 303 (2006) ("[W]hat can explain
free revealing of privately funded innovations and enthusiastic participation in projects to
produce a public good? ... [We should review the assumption in private investment models
that free revealing of innovations developed with private funds will represent a loss of private
profit for the innovator."). The arguments surface at the intersection of intellectual property
and antitrust, and are common in antitrust analysis of vertical arrangements. See, e.g.,
Warren S. Grimes, The Sylvania Free Rider Justification for Downstream-Power Vertical
Restraints: Truth or Invitation for Pretext?, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE
MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 181 (Robert
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The distortion also manifests on the demand side in terms of lost
signals about what consumers want and where investments should
be directed. The lost signals characterization follows from the notion
of externalities as missing markets or unpriced exchanges, and thus
depends on the premise noted earlier about the correspondence
between market and social demand.
To avoid distortions associated with externalities, the standard
economic solution is to internalize the externalities by pricing the
exchanges or enabling missing markets to operate. How is internal-
ization accomplished? For some time, most economists accepted
Pigou's view that the government ought to "intervene" via the tax or
regulatory system and force externality-producing agents to fully
account for their actions.2" Thus, those who engage in activities that
produce negative (positive) externalities, such as pollution (educa-
tion), should be taxed (subsidized) at a level that takes into account
external effects and thus aligns private and social costs (benefits).2"
In The Problem of Social Cost,29 Coase challenged the Pigovian tra-
dition and added well-defined property rights to the menu of options
for dealing with externalities. ° By definition (within economics),
property rights are perfectly defined only in a world without
externalities.31 Of course, the real world is not only afflicted with
Pitofsky ed., 2008); Marina Lao, Free Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing Explanation
for Resale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra, at
196; Daniel F. Spulber, Competition Policy and the Incentive To Innovate: The Dynamic Effects
of Microsoft v. Commission, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 247, 249-78 (2008) (asserting forcefully and
repeatedly but not measuring or empirically supporting the argument that incentives to
invest will be dramatically impacted). The strategic holdout story works well in some contexts,
but it depends too much on assumptions regarding deliberate strategic behavior, existing
preferences, and complete markets to fully describe the public goods problem. See infra note
52.
27. A. C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 127-30, 229-31 (4th ed. 1932).
28. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 72-78; Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note
23, at 381-82.
29. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960).
30. See, e.g., id.
31. In such a world, the range of "sanctioned behavioral relations among economic agents
in the use of valuable resources" is completely and unambiguously delineated. See also Harold
A. Demsetz, Property Rights, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
144 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND THE LAW 142-67 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred. S.
McChesney eds., 2003). As Gary Libecap explains: "In the limit, if property rights are so well
defined that private and social net benefits are equalized in economic decisions, benefits and
costs will be entirely borne by the owner," and thus there will be no externalities. Libecap,
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transactions costs, but also is awash in imperfectly defined property
rights and externalities.
As Harold Demsetz astutely observed in his seminal article,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights,3 2 such real world imperfections
create demand for property rights evolution. Demsetz took a dif-
ferent approach than Coase and advanced a theory of property
rights evolution where imperfectly defined property rights improve
and evolve to meet societal demand for the internalization of
externalities, taking into account the costs and benefits of internal-
ization.33 According to Demsetz, "[e]very cost and benefit associated
with social interdependencies is a potential externality," and actual
externalities exist when benefits or costs are not taken into account
by interacting parties because "[t]he cost of a transaction in the
rights between the parties (internalization) must exceed the gains
from internalization." 4 Transaction costs may be prohibitively high
for a variety of reasons, including the number of people involved,
problems associated with tracing benefits and costs to responsible
actors, strategic behavior, and so on. Beyond transaction costs,
however, loom tremendous institutional costs associated with
defining, allocating, and enforcing rights.
The property theories described thus far are readily extended to
the realm of intellectual property. Intellectual activities and goods
of many different types generate externalities of many different
types,3" and the existence and persistence of such externalities, and
thus nonexistence of potential markets, gives rise to demand for
internalization mechanisms, such as intellectual property rights,
and corresponding markets.36 In a sense, the property theories re-
flect a more general statement of the supply-oriented IP theories
described above."
supra, at 145.
32. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
33. Id. at 348.
34. Id.
35. For an explanation of different types of externalities generated by the production,
sharing, and use of ideas, see Frischmann, Speech, supra note 10, at 310-21; Frischmann &
Lemley, supra note 2, at 258-61.
36. See HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM, 106-17 (2008);
Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 31, at 144; Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 129. I
discuss this point further below. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
37. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 119. Many intellectual property scholars have
examined this connection. See, e.g., Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 16, at 464-66;
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II. SPILLOVERS THEORY
Spillovers theory reflects a critical turn away from the economic
theories discussed above. It attempts internal reform, so to speak,
by aiming (1) to reject casual dismissal of spillovers (third party
effects) that are not easily observed and quantified, (2) to bring
attention to the value of identifying and supporting spillover-
producing activities, (3) to show how certain types of nonrival
resources can be leveraged to support such activities, and (4) to
acknowledge and study the complex relationships between complex
human and resource systems."8 The gist of the spillovers argument
is that society may be better off letting some externalities go
without aiming to internalize them and, moreover, encouraging
participation in activities that generate externalities (again, without
aiming to internalize them completely). In the context of intellectual
property law, society accomplishes those ends through a variety of
legal arrangements that enable sharing and productive use of
nonrival resources-in essence, leveraging nonrivalry.39 The argu-
ment is complex and involves both supply and demand side
arguments that I will not reiterate here.4 ° In this Article, I focus on
two points of contention: first, that externalities do not necessarily
cause economic distortions, and second, that even when they do, the
distortions may be welfare enhancing.
The first point is pretty straightforward, though often taken for
granted. Claims, or worse, assumptions, that internalizing exter-
Gordon, supra note 1, at 617; Lemley, supra note 9, at 1031; Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Giovanni B. Ramello,
Intellectual Property and the Markets of Ideas, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 161, 161-75 (2005).
38. See generally Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2.
39. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 942 (2005) [hereinafter Frischmann, Economic Theory]
(beginning to explore how nonrivalry can be leveraged); Frischmann, Speech, supra note 10
(same); Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2 (explaining how nonrivalry can be leveraged to
support capabilities); Frischmann, Consequentialism, supra note 18 (same).
40. See generally Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2. Beyond the supply and demand-
side arguments, we also explain why the distinction between "pecuniary" and "technological"
externalities may collapse in the intellectual property context because what look like
pecuniary externalities (or mere wealth transfers) in a static sense may be technological
externalities in a dynamic sense. See id. at 262-64. Accordingly, throughout this Article, I do
not distinguish between pecuniary and technological externalities.
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nalities would necessarily lead to changes in behavior or resource
allocation are overblown and not theoretically or empirically
supported. Many externalities are simply "irrelevant."'" Whether or
not internalized by actors, the actors do not change their actions.42
To internalize or not to internalize is really a question of transfer-
ring wealth in such cases. Although distributional considerations
might warrant policies that aim to limit or promote such transfers,
efficiency considerations do not. Critically, this point places a sig-
nificant limit on the supply-side rationale for internalization (that
is, the perceived benefits of internalization) and the persistently
overblown arguments about free riding and speculative diminution
of incentives to invest.4 3 It also connects with the empirical observa-
tions made by scholars that in many contexts, capturing value
realized by others-through monetary returns or otherwise-is not
necessary to support incentives to create because people prefer to
create for their own reasons.44
The second point is that even when internalization affects
behavior, and thus the externalities are relevant, it may be best to
leave externalities alone or even encourage their unmetered flow. It
does not necessarily improve matters to internalize the externali-
ties. Critically, this is so not just because the administrative and
institutional costs of internalization may be high (though that may
be the case sometimes), but also because the reallocation of benefits
or costs accomplished by internalization may affect the behavior of
other actors besides the internalizing actor.45 This means that in
41. Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 23, at 371.
42. For further discussion and examples, see Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian
Trend, supra note 3, at 660; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 259-60. See generally
Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 23.
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See generally Lemley, supra note 9, at 1031-
32.
44. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2009) ("Psychological and sociological concepts can do more to
explain creative impulses than classical economics. As a result, a copyright law that treats
creativity as a product of economic incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to
promote."); see, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 35 (2006) (providing examples such as noncommercial
research institutes, volunteer software creators, and National Public Radio listeners and
contributors); von Hipple & von Krogh, supra note 26, at 300 (discussing examples in open
source software communities). See generally ERIC VON HIPPLE, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION
(2005) (on user innovation).
45. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 288 ("Fair use deems lawful some uses that
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contexts involving incentive-relevant externalities, the benefits
and costs of internalization must include not only impacts on
internalizing actors but also impacts on third parties.
It may be the case that letting, or even encouraging, spillovers to
flow to third parties may be worthwhile for society.4" This is more
likely when these third party beneficiaries are productive in ways
that generate social benefits. Transforming third party beneficiaries
into licensees who must pay to act may shift their behavior,
reducing the intensity of their productive activity or causing them
to act differently altogether, leading to reductions in the desired
social benefits. This result is to be expected when licensees cannot
capture the full value of their own activities-that is, when their
activities generate positive third party effects. Under these cir-
cumstances, the licensees' private demand will fall short of social
demand, a problem of demand manifestation. This problem may
lead to market failure. It may lead to underparticipation in the
spillover-producing activity and thus undersupply of the spillovers,
or it may lead to optimization of the licensed input for a narrower
range of uses than would be socially desirable.47 Finally, it may have
no impact other than to transfer wealth from licensee to licensor.
The point is that we cannot simply assume the market mechanism
will best aggregate demand information. Thus, we need a better
theory of demand in such contexts.48
When externalities are incentive relevant, the case for internal-
ization depends, in part, on the degree to which all other markets
are complete. Unless spillovers are internalized throughout society
-which is impossible-the case for internalization in any particular
context must somehow account for cascading effects in other
dependent markets and many incomplete and missing markets,
including nonmarket systems. Such accounting is quite difficult and
requires considerably more attention to context, as discussed below.
Especially, but by no means exclusively, in the context of re-
search, innovation, and cultural expression, it may be preferable to
encourage cascading spillovers rather than damming the flows
yield benefits to third parties, not because the transaction costs ... are necessarily high, but
rather to sustain the flow of spillovers to third parties.").
46. WILLIAM J. BAUMAL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 121-23 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 39, at 939-41.
48. See id. (discussing this assumption).
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upstream and pricing/coordinating everything downstream through
the market mechanism. To be clear, the point made here (and
elsewhere) is not that nothing should be priced and everything
should be openly accessible and usable.49 There are benefits and
costs to both management/allocation regimes, and the benefits
and costs vary for different resources along various dimensions.
Moreover, legal systems can and often do mix the two regimes,
allowing some uses of a resource to be allocated by the market and
designating other uses to be open.5 °
In fact, intellectual property systems do exactly this in order to
enable some internalization and promote some externalities.5'
Determining how to serve and balance these two functions depends
on, inter alia, the types of intellectual resources (including supply
characteristics such as production costs), types of resource uses
(including consumption and productive activities that use the
resource), and the nature of the relevant communities (including
producers, users, and third party beneficiaries).
In his reply, Demsetz dismisses the two points noted above
with two points of his own." First, he reminds us that "[i]t costs
49. In Spillovers, Mark Lemley and I explain the need for mixed regimes. See Frischmann
& Lemley, supra note 2, at 275. Of course, the need to balance incentives and access is
nothing new and has been a long-standing feature of intellectual property scholarship in
general and the economic analysis of intellectual property in particular. Still, as we explain,
the conventional account had some important deficiencies, including: (1) a tendency to
overstate (or simply assume) that incentives to invest and supply increase with increased
internalization, and thus ignore, inter alia, the "irrelevance" of some externalities and the
diminishing returns in terms of incentives to further internalization; (2) acceptance of the
premise that the price mechanism will best aggregate demand information; and (3) failure to
explain adequately (at least, in our view) why it would be efficient for intellectual property
laws to encourage the flow of spillovers. Id. at 266, 279.
50. See, e.g., Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend, supra note 3, at 652-53.
51. For examples from copyright and patent, see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2.
52. Demsetz also attempts to refute my contention "that the market may fail to allocate
resources efficiently in cases where consumer's willingness to pay understates societal
demand." Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 131. First, he suggests that my contention concerns
a "misrepresentation of private demands because of an operative free rider problem." Id. This
is not correct, however. My claim does not rest on strategic misrepresentation by a free rider
seeking to avoid contributing to provision of a public good or the like. Of course, the classic
strategic holdout story works well in some contexts, but it depends too much on assumptions
concerning (1) deliberate strategic behavior, (2) existing preferences, and (3) completeness in
dependent markets to fully describe the demand problem.
Second, Demsetz argues that "[tihere is no necessary inefficiency unless Frischmann
provides alternative institutions (such as the State or the court) that can measure private
demands more accurately and/or more cheaply than the market." Id. I did not claim
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something to internalize externalities, so internalization is not
always efficient."53 This reminder is important because it reinforces
Demsetz's admonition that his property rights theory is positive
and not normative. 4 Still, the reminder does not undermine the
spillovers argument at all. If anything, Demsetz focuses attention
on identification and evaluation of the full range of relevant costs
and benefits, which is precisely the point of drawing attention to
spillovers. Ultimately, Demsetz does not specify fully what costs
should be taken into account, and he does not address the argument
that creating a market may entail social costs above and beyond
institutional costs associated with delineating and assigning rights
and transaction costs associated with market exchange. The reason
why relates to his second point.
Second, Demsetz maintains that externalities are really a product
of the market because
[j]ust as the market dictates that there will be no good X if the
cost of producing X exceeds what people are willing to pay for it,
so the market dictates that there will be no market if the cost of
producing the market exceeds what people are willing to pay for
it.5
5
"necessary inefficiency," nor did I make a claim about comparative competence of one system
or another in assessing demand. I claimed that markets may fail under conditions when
licensees cannot capture the full value of their own activities. The State or courts are probably
better suited to identify activities when such failures can be expected to be persistent, for
example, as is arguably done in the fair use doctrine. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note
2, at 287.
53. Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 131.
54. Demsetz takes me to task for my "somewhat reluctant infusing of [his] article with
normative intent." Id. at 127. In both Spillovers and the Demsetzian Trend articles, I note that
Demsetz may not have intended to make the normative argument and that "much like the
manner in which interpretations of Ronald Coase's scholarship have taken his original
insights in unintended directions, Demsetz's property theory has likewise been extended to
support normative arguments for increased propertization and privatization of valuable
resources." Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend, supra note 3, at 651; Frischmann
& Lemley, supra note 2, at 265 n.23. In his reply, Demsetz strongly rejects any normative
intent and emphasizes that he had discussed how, for example, it can be efficient for property
rights to evolve from private property to common property depending on the relevant costs
and benefits. Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 129-30. But cf. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land
Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 8-9 n.17).
55. Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 131.
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There are two problems with this argument, however. First, it
equates supply and demand for property rights (or other internaliza-
tion mechanisms such as regulation) with a market. Demsetz is
right to say that supply and demand, or costs and'benefits, may
drive property rights evolution, but, as he stresses in his recent
book, the process by which such evolution occurs in courts and other
lawmaking institutions is not usually a market subject to the price
system.56 It is difficult to see how common law development of
doctrines such as fair use can be characterized as markets subject
to the price mechanism; I appreciate though that people may use
"market for law" or perhaps even "market for doctrine" as a met-
aphor.
Second, even putting the previous problem aside, Demsetz's ar-
gument ignores the fact that the participants in the various
"markets" in question may themselves fail to appreciate the impact
on third parties. Participants in the market for a market for X are
not likely the same (complete set) as the participants in the market
for X, nor are the third parties affected by the actions of either set
of market participants the same. We cannot assume that everyone
participates in each market or in some macro-market-for-potential-
markets without simply assuming away the notion of third party
effects altogether. So it seems we cannot really be confident that
externalities (or the absence of a market) is an efficient product of
the market system because the social value of having the market
may exceed what people are willing to pay for it.
Externalities complicate, if not completely confound, various
utilitarian economic models and theories.57 This observation might
be accepted only grudgingly by some economists, but it follows
directly from the fact that many economic models and theories
simply assume away externalities. Consider, for example, that much
of the regulatory economics tradition rests on an assumption of no
56. See DEMSETZ, supra note 36, at 106-17 (noting that courts are not subject to price
mechanism); see also Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 129-30 (noting that the processes by
which rights evolution takes place are left unspecified by Demsetz and citing sources
discussing this point); Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend, supra note 3, at 652-53
(acknowledging this point).
57. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law:
Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7 (2005) (noting that, although IP law is
utilitarian in nature, IP law makes it nearly impossible to adopt an economic approach to
positive externalities).
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externalities." Those models, theories, or economists that do not
assume externalities away often work with a subset of externalities
that are easily identified and for which the "missing market" may
be constructed or captured via some championed institutional fix.
This is seen vividly in the utilitarian economic theories of intellec-
tual property.
Critically, when externalities are difficult to identify or capture,
these exact difficulties may preclude further consideration-if we
cannot easily identify, much less measure, externalities, how should
we go about integrating them into our models and analyses? How do
we know which external effects count or how to choose or weigh
them? Talking about externalities may seem akin to academic hand
waving.59
Nonetheless, spillovers matter and should not be dismissed so
easily. Spillovers represent value in the form of positive third party
effects. They are ubiquitous and a necessary consequence of an
increasingly interdependent society.6" That spillovers are difficult
58. Alfred Kahn wrote the seminal treatise on the economics of regulation, and it remains
the foundational text. In the treatise, Kahn explicitly qualifies his analysis with the
assumption that there are no externalities and notes that if that assumption is relaxed, much
of the analysis may change. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONS 193-98 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1988). Essentially, the case for regulation (or
more generally, government intervention in some form or another) is much stronger. Of
course, this does not mean that the case is made-the case depends on the degree to which
government intervention can improve matters.
I must note that I am baffled by the assumption of no externalities in some areas, like
communications, where spillover effects associated with speech and information flows are
rampant and arguably (should) define the relevant policy space. For example, it seems odd
and quite troubling that the current network neutrality debate largely revolves around
whether network owners have market power and whether discrimination among data packets
causes anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Barbara van Schewich & David Farber,
Point/Counterpoint: Network Neutrality Nuances, COMM. ACM, Feb. 2009, at 31, 31-32
(making the same point). Framing the debate in this manner makes little sense: competitive
markets do not solve the externality problems or guarantee an efficient allocation of
resources; this is Economics 101. Of course, this does not mean that market power and
anticompetitive effects do not matter-there are potential costs to regulation that may
include, inter alia, anticompetitive effects, losses in consumer welfare, and diminution in
incentives to innovate. Nor does it mean that recognizing the existence and importance of
spillovers provides easy, determinate answers. The debate is and must be complicated and
should not be focused myopically on a subset of issues.
59. Julie Cohen seems to have picked up on this line of argument in her critique. See
supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
60. See BAUMAL, supra note 46, at 117.
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to identify or capture only means we ought to pay much closer
attention to their creation.6' We should ask:
" How are they created?
" Which activities generate spillovers?
" What conditions support these activities?
" What types of externalities are created?
* How are the externalities distributed to or realized by third
parties?
" Do third parties realize costs and benefits cognitively with
awareness and appreciation (and perhaps a willingness to
pay if a market were to form), or are the costs and benefits
realized more passively, taken for granted, or perhaps
appreciated only vaguely?62
" Can we differentiate among types of externality-producing
activities and types of externalities in a manner that is
relevant to decision making despite problems with quantifica-
tion and measurement?
Attention to these questions presents fundamental challenges
to an economic approach. Let me use an example to show why.63
61. In his excellent book, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, Yochai Benkler made a very similar
point: "Social production of goods and services, both public and private, is ubiquitous, though
unnoticed. It sometimes substitutes for, and sometimes complements, market and state
production everywhere. It is, to be fanciful, the dark matter of our economic production
universe." BENKLER, supra note 44, at 117.
62. This inquiry is related, but not identical, to the behavioral economics considerations
of bounded rationality, decision-making heuristics, and the like. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 59-209 (Cass A. Sunstein ed., 2000). In a sense, the inquiry is focused on
identifying third party effects that are unknown and, to some degree, unknowable to the
individual third parties and yet still identifiable when analyzed from a broader social
perspective, perhaps by focusing on categories of conduct and activities that generate such
effects and/or on nonrival resources that can be leveraged to generate such effects. Of course,
designing institutions based on such an inquiry raises (1) a classic paternalism-elitism
critique and (2) Demsetz's concern about the comparative competence of market, government,
and other institutions. Although I appreciate both types of criticism and acknowledge the
need to keep them in mind, I do not believe either altogether undermines the inquiry or effort
to design institutions based on it. On (2), see Demsetz Reply, supra note 4, at 128 ("[M]uch
of what I wrote [in my 1967 article] is focused on the externality problem, but the general
concern is with the efficiency of social arrangements. Circumstantial changes that make
existing inefficiencies more serious ... will prompt appropriate revisions of ownership rights.").
On (1), I will just say (for now) that the critique only gets you so far, unless you are a firm
believer in libertarianism, which I am not.
63. The rest of this paragraph and the next two paragraphs are drawn from an essay. See
Frischmann, Speech, supra note 10, at 313-16 (footnotes omitted). The essay explains in
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Consider speech, an expressive, communicative activity that shares
ideas and regularly generates externalities. Speech often has
dynamic and systemic implications that are unanticipated and
underappreciated by speakers and their audiences. The effects may
be small in magnitude and may not be immediately salient to the
speaker or audience. This is probably the case for the vast majority
of speech. Nonetheless, we should expect the aggregate impact
across many participants in many conversations to be substantial,
for two reasons. First, and perhaps most obvious, small external
effects add up as speech, information, and ideas propagate widely
across communities. Second, sometimes the unanticipated and
underappreciated effects of communicated ideas turn out to be quite
large in magnitude. Yet, for a variety of well-understood reasons, it
is not easy to "pick winners," to foresee or even recognize early on
those "killer ideas" that yield substantial social value, occasionally
through systemic change.64
Consider, for example, the speech of a nonprofessional blogger
pertaining to some political issue, for example, the Iraq War, civil
rights, or property tax reform. 5 The speech may have external
effects beyond those who write, read, or comment on the blog itself
because the speech-the ideas and information communicated-may
impact awareness and opinion within the community affected by
the political issue being discussed, and perhaps the speech may
ultimately affect political processes. The likelihood that any par-
ticular speaker will have a noticeable impact may be small, but that
is beside the point.66 Society benefits when its members participate
because of the aggregate effects, and there is a persistent risk of
underparticipation in the process and of underproduction of the
speech. Speech affects community systems and community mem-
considerably more detail how speech shares ideas and generates different types of
externalities.
64. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52 (1962).
65. Consider, for example, the role of blogs in revealing flaws in electronic voting
machines, mobilizing activists, and enabling public scrutiny and debate. See BENKLER, supra
note 44, at 217-25; Daniel W. Drezner & Henry Farrell, Web of Influence, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Nov.-Dec. 2004, at, 32, 32-33; Kevin Wallsten, Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An
Analysis of the Relationship Between Mainstream Media and Political Blogs, 24 REV. POL'y
RES. 567 (2007).
66. It is beside the limited point I am making. I use this example only to show how the
external effects may occur and not to support an empirical claim.
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bers, even community members who do not participate in the
conversation.67
The external effects from speech are not limited to political
systems. Speech externalities are often due to complex interdepen-
dencies between communication-information systems and other
complementary human systems that depend upon speech in-
puts-we can attach many different labels to describe these systems
including cultural, economic, educational, political, social, and so on.
Analytically, the challenge in employing economics derives from
the difficulties in capturing benefits and costs realized in noneco-
nomic systems (but caused by or at least related to actions in
economic systems). Are the cultural or political benefits one realizes
only passively because the benefits are a result of the actions of
others even cognizable within economics? I believe so.68 Yet Anne
Barron, in a thoughtful critique, suggests that Mark Lemley and I
necessarily venture beyond economics in our attempt to incorporate
such values into an economic theory of intellectual property. 9 In her
view (and perhaps others'), these sorts of benefits and costs are
strictly noneconomic. If the values are not reflected in preferences
or do not register with a person directly triggering a willingness to
pay, then the values will not be reflected accurately in mar-
kets-which is the demand manifestation point, of course. ' ° If
identifying and giving weight to such values necessarily takes one
outside of economics, then so be it-that is a boundary that must be
crossed.
But I am not so sure it does. Economists of many stripes within
many different fields (or subdisciplines) of economics recognize the
existence and importance of social values not reflected in (existing)
preferences or markets.71 As I discuss below, the argument seems to
67. See, e.g., Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 39, at 1017-20.
68. I discuss such values from an economic perspective in most of the articles I have
written.
69. See Barron, supra note 5, at 9, 18.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION (Patricia A. Champ et al. eds., 2003)
(nonmarket goods); CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10 (various public and nonmarket goods);
A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES:
THEORY AND METHODS 6-9 (2d ed. 2003) (environmental resources); AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999) (capabilities); Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social
Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACTED PERSPECTIVE 3 (Partha Dasgupta and Ismail
Serageldin eds., 2001) (social capital); Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW
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rest to some degree on a conception of economics rooted in a narrow
version of cost-benefit analysis. Among other things, this narrow
conception (1) substitutes Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for Pareto opti-
mality;v2 and (2) for the sake of determinacy, modeling convenience,
or other reasons, disregards or makes simplifying assumptions
about information and effects that are difficult to observe, quantify,
value, and/or monetize. Critically, this is not a position shared by
all, or even most, economists. The position has been critiqued
extensively by economists and noneconomists alike and is the topic
of a rich and voluminous literature.73
Interestingly, Barron also suggests that my approach is in accord
with Demsetz's economic approach because, according to her, I
admit that cost-benefit analysis is appropriate but argue that
certain costs of internalization are overlooked.74 Perhaps she is
right. To date, I have worked with utilitarian economics and at-
tempted to shed light on the social costs not well accounted for in
the conventional economic theories of intellectual property. The
difficulty is deciding what social costs count in the cost-benefit
analysis, and relatedly, whether, and if so how, systemic costs
PALGRAvE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIcs 452-53 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (merit goods);
Emile Quntet, Valuations of Environmental Externalities: Some Recent Results, in
INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT 271 (David F. Batten &
Charlie Karlsson eds., 1996) (infrastructure).
72. See EDWARD J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 104 (5th ed. 2007)
(discussing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion).
73. See generally GARY STANLEY BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS:
MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 8 (2003) ("Economists usually assume that
utility functions depend either directly on the goods and services consumed, or on household
commodities produced with time and purchased with goods and services. Social forces are
either ignored or left to lurk in the background as part of the general environment."); Ana
Bedate, Luis Cdsar Herrero & Jos6 Angel Sanz, Economic Valuation of the Cultural Heritage:
Application to Four Case Studies in Spain, 5 J. CULTURAL HERITAGE 101 (2004); Arne Risa
Hole, A Comparison of Approaches to Estimating Confidence Intervals for Willingness To Pay
Measures, 16 HEALTH ECON. 827 (2007); Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade,
Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses To Public
Issues, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 203 (1999); Paul R. Portney, The Contingent Valuation
Debate: Why Economists Should Care, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1994); A.L. Toivonen et al., The
Economic Value of Recreational Fisheries in Nordic Countries, 11 FISHERIES MGMT. &
ECOLOGY 1 (2004); Olav Velthuis, Symbolic Meanings of Prices: Constructing the Value of
Contemporary Art in Amsterdam and New York Galleries, 32 THEORY & SOC'Y 181 (2003) ('I
interpret the price mechanism as a symbolic system. Despite the impersonal, businesslike
connotations of prices, I argue that actors in markets manage to express a range of cognitive
and cultural meanings through them.").
74. See Barron, supra note 5, at 25.
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(associated with foregone spillovers) that are difficult to observe and
measure enter into the analysis.
These concerns are remarkably similar to those faced in environ-
mental economics with respect to ecosystems and other "nonmarket
values."75 We know, without a doubt, that ecosystems generate
substantial social value through many different types of ecosystem
functions and ecosystem services; we also know, without a doubt,
that we fail to appreciate fully this value. 6
Valuing and managing environmental resources is extremely
difficult. We tend to take for granted the environment within which
we live; our own preferences and values fail to appreciate the
complex interdependencies between ourselves, our environment,
and others. Consequently, our decisions about how to manage our
own interactions with the environment are not likely to be social
welfare maximizing. The environment persistently contributes to
our well-being, but most often it does so only indirectly. We rarely
pay directly for its benefits, and so when it comes down to individual
preferences or valuation-for example, preferences measured in
terms of willingness to pay or revealed through our actions-it
should not be surprising that we persistently undervalue the
environment, in terms of its contributions to our own well-being
(and putting aside notions of intrinsic value)."
75. See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 11
(2003) (questioning the adequacy of the approach of Chicago School economics and advocating
an Economic Dynamics analysis); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 558 (2004)
(concluding efficiency cost-benefit analysis is an unacceptably crude device for guiding policy
and citing academics critical of such cost-benefit analyses and proponents of other methods).
I develop the argument made in this paragraph in more detail in a recent article. See Brett
M. Frischmann, Environmental Infrastructure, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 151, 170 (2008).
76. See Gretchen C. Daily et al., The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value, 289
SCIENCE 395, 395 (2000) (discussing the difficulties of valuing ecosystem assets and noting
that "[o]ften, the importance of ecosystem services is widely appreciated only upon their loss").
77. See DRIESEN, supra note 75, at 11; MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEMASSESSMENT, EcoSYSTEMS
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS, at v-vi (2005), available at http://www.millennium
assessment.orgdocuments/document.356.aspx.pdf; Daily, supra note 76, at 395; Frischmann,
Environmental Infrastructure, supra note 75, at 163; Kysar, supra note 75, at 589; J.B. Ruhl
& James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 157, 157 (2007); James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr., & Gretchen C. Daily,
Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 311
(2001) (discussing "[o]ur unthinking reliance on ecosystem services").
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Of course, we have limited resources and necessarily make
tradeoffs in policy, economics, and other decisions. As a result, en-
vironmental law and policy depends heavily on economic analysis of
these tradeoffs and cost-benefit analysis. v8 Some argue that it is
better to identify and attempt to value ecosystem services because
assigning some value is better than assigning no value. 9 Others
argue that such comfort is misplaced because it accepts the
analytical paradigm of cost-benefit analysis and provides a false
sense of security that ecosystems are being sufficiently valued and
protected.' (This is very similar to the debate about the use of
economics in intellectual property.) Although the debate is ongoing,
it is important to recognize that this is a debate about the use of
cost-benefit analysis in framing and making environmental policy
decisions and does not suggest that the economics discipline only
recognizes value reflected in existing preferences. In fact, it is well
understood within environmental economics that aggregating
individual preferences is a poor proxy for the social value of many
environmental resources.8
This highlights where Anne Barron's and Harold Demsetz's
critiques potentially converge. Barron, quoting Demsetz, states:
Demsetz regards it as simply meaningless to say that there is
something called a societal benefit or cost that is separable from
private benefits and costs without relinquishing the fundamen-
tal premise of modern economics, which is that "social cost and
social benefit are, respectively, summations of privately borne
cost benefits." 2
78. See, e.g., DRIESEN, supra note 75, at 15-16; Kysar, supra note 75, at 587.
79. See generally James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887
(1997).
80. See Kysar, supra note 75, at 557 (discussing the deceptive lure of cost-benefit
analysis's comprehensive rationality).
81. See DRIESEN, supra note 75, at 21 ("Our view of what society should be like reflects
more than the aggregate of our individual desires as consumers. It reflects a combined version
of our values and interests."). Douglas Kysar elaborates on the inadequacies of preferences
in the context of environmental law. See Kysar, supra note 75, at 586; see also DRIESEN, supra
note 75, at 20-22 (critiquing cost-benefit analysis's use of aggregating preferences in the
context of policy goals). Both authors provide ample citations to the literature.
82. Barron, supra note 5, at 28 n.100.
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As I understand Demsetz, he means to invoke only the basic
utilitarian premise that social welfare is the sum of aggregated
individual utilities, in which case, there is no real conflict." Mark
Lemley and I do not commit ourselves "to the view that social
welfare is not reducible to the aggregate of private utilities."'  We
take a utilitarian approach but critically examine the degree to
which and manner in which certain types of benefits and costs are
created and borne by individuals in an interdependent society. As
discussed above, we emphasize the importance of recognizing that
spillovers are ubiquitous (that is, there are many incomplete and
missing markets), that spillovers flow across and within various
interdependent systems in ways that are not easily observed,
appreciated and quantified, and therefore that private demand
necessarily will fall short of social demand in many contexts.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the role of law in regulating and promoting
different externality-producing activities requires the study of
interdependencies among people, resources, and actions within and
across complex nested systems, including cultural, economic, and
political systems.8 5 Of course, it also requires the comparative
83. At least, not with the approach I have taken so far. In a work-in-progress, I have
begun to explore a nonutilitarian consequentialist approach that would in fact recognize social
value separable from private utility. See Frischmann, Consequentialism, supra note 18; see
also Cohen, supra note 6, at 1159-62 (discussing forms of consequentialism relevant to IP
discourse, calling for a more complex consequentialism, and focusing on the capabilities
approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum as a decent candidate).
84. Barron, supra note 5, at 26 n.92. To be fair, Barron suggests that we "seem to be
committing [our]selves to th[is] view," based on our claim that internalizing externalities is
not the "silver bullet that magically aligns private and social welfare." Id.
85. To date, I have attempted to identify conditions when persistent flaws in demand
manifestation associated with user generated spillovers provide justifications for sustaining
commons in (or common access to) nonrivalrously consumed capital resources ("nonrival
capital"). What emerges from my prior work is admittedly inconclusive, nuanced, and both
context- and resource-specific in terms of its prescriptions. Even with respect to the subset of
nonrival capital for which commons management seems most appealing-infrastructural
capital-my prescriptions become tangled up in the contextual details, such as:
* the type of infrastructural resource;
* the degree to which it is purely nonrival (ideas) or partially nonrival (congestible);
* the types of user activities the resource potentially supports;
* the types of outputs those activities potentially generate; and
* the types and scope of externalities generated.
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analysis of legal institutions created by people to regulate their
actions with respect to each other and the resources that comprise
their environment. This is a complex task. Again, I do not believe
this task is necessarily beyond the reach of economics and reliant on
another social theory, as Barron suggests. But it could be (depend-
ing on how one defines economics and its boundaries), and it would
be a mistake, in my view, to ignore the intersections between eco-
nomics and other social theories, methodologies, and disciplines.
These are boundaries that I hope to explore more in the future.
Getting tangled in these nuances is preferable, in my view, to ignoring them or adopting
simplifying assumptions, and it is inevitable given the cross-disciplinary reach of the analysis;
the details vary considerably across resource types (communications facilities, environmental
resources, ideas, and so on).
824 [Vol. 51:801
